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Abstract 
In a recent paper Martin Loughlin laments the fact that during 'the last 20 years or so' a 
serious misunderstanding of constitutional authority has found its way into a great deal of 
social, legal, and political thinking. Loughlin contends that this misunderstanding is a 
reaction to 'the growing range of govemmental functions now being exercised through 
supra- or transnational institutional anangements'. In a not-unrelated set of papers, 
Grahame Thompson highlights the way this problematic thinking about constitutionalism 
has infected discussions about the role of global corporations, especially those that 
attempt to grant to some global corporations the status 'global corporate citizen'. After 
setting out a distinctive understanding of 'the social', this paper explores some aspects of 
these interventions by Loughlin and Thompson. The paper then builds on their insights to 
develop an argument that the category of social citizenship is unsustainable. 
Keywords: constitutionalism, citizenship, the social, social citizenship, politics, law, 
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Introduction 
In a recent paper Martin Loughlin laments the fact that during 'the last 20 years or so' a 
serious misunderstanding of constitutional authority has found its way into a great deal of 
social, legal, and political thinking. Loughlin contends that this misunderstanding is a 
reaction to 'the growing range of governmental functions now being exercised through 
supra- or transnational institutional arrangements' . It entails the assumption that 'we are 
living today in a post-industrial or post-modem era' and it entails the related assumption 
that we are 'entering an era of post-state, post-sovereignty'. As a corollary of these 
assumptions, the misunderstanding features a commitment to think about rule in terms of 
multi-level government, based on transnational and international constitutionalism 
(Loughlin 2009:  1-2). In a not-unrelated set of papers, Grahame Thompson highlights the 
way this problematic thinking about constitutionalism has infected discussions about the 
role of global corporations, especially those that attempt to grant to some global 
corporations the status 'global corporate citizen' (see esp.: Thompson 2006; 2008; 2009). 
This paper will first explore some aspects of these interventions by Loughlin and 
Thompson, then, in its second section and its conclusion, it will build on their insights to 
develop an argument that the category of social citizenship is unsustainable. 
In all this I will be drawing on my previously formulated arguments about the nature of 
the category 'the social' (see esp.: Wickham 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; Wickham 4 
and Evers 2010). Here I have room only for a brief summary of what I regard as the main 
features of the social. 
While I do not reject the common idea that the social is fundamentally about human 
interaction, I do reject the idea that the social is no more than human interaction and I 
reject the related idea that in being only about interaction the social is timeless and 
universal. As we shall see later, it is the idea of the timeless and universal social that 
informs the category of social citizenship. 
I think it is far more productive to understand the social as a particular historical 
development, with its own times and places. In this way, the social is a domain of safety 
and freedom which emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century, as the result of a 
process whereby a complex amalgam of politics, law, sovereignty, and state was able to 
bring to an end a long period of devastating civil war, generated in the main by a 
sequence of  dramatic confessional shifts, sometimes referred to as  'the Reformation'. As 
it relates to citizenship, then, the social is a domain of this world with its own complex 
history; it is not a universal, timeless, metaphysical gift. 
To wrap up this summary of my account of the social I need to offer my particular 
definitions of each of the four components in the crucial 'complex amalgam' that 
produced the social as a distinct domain. 5 
Politics for this amalgam has two forms. The first is what Schmitt calls 'the political'. It 
is concerned with deciding at any time who is friend and who is foe and then with the 
killing of foes (Schmitt 1976). The other face of politics is concerned with a gronping of 
non-violent activities (administration, discussion, diplomacy, policy formation, etc.) 
which, Longhlin proposes, 'enables the activity of  governing to be effectively conducted' 
(Loughlin 2003: 39; see also 156-7). 
Law for this amalgam is both the cOllstituting of the sovereign - the law that was 'created 
by the secularization, historicization and positivization of natural law' , that is, the body of 
law often called 'public law' - and all the laws 'created as a conseqnence of' the 
constituting pnblic law, that is, the body of  law often called 'positive law' (Loughlin 
2009: 5). 
Sovereignty for this amalgam has two forms, in much the same way that politics has two 
forms. The first form is extremely basic and raw yet full of  power, while the other is less 
powerful but more sophisticated and subtle. Here too Schmitt's work is helpful in 
thinking through what is entailed in the raw form. In ShOlt, for Schmitt raw sovereignty is 
the capacity to decide on the exception, that is, the capacity to make an effective decision 
(one which is realised) about a situation which has truly broken with what is normal. The 
exception in Schmitt's hands is not really a matter of rarity, though he does not deny that 
in practice exceptions are very rare. Rather, the exception effectively defines sovereignty 
inasmuch as it produces a decision in the fullest sense of  that word, that is, the capacity to 
enforce it (Schmitt 2005: 5). In a concrete setting, Schmitt argues, as opposed to an 6 
abstract definition, the ultimate exception is that which threatens the existence of all 
protections against the danger of civil war, including the state. By its very nature the 
exception cannot be dealt with by norms alone for it is precisely that which is not normal, 
that which the normal cannot possibly anticipate (Schmitt 2005: 5-6). Loughlin (2003: 
92) defines the other type of sovereignty as  'an institutional framework established for 
the purpose of maintaining and promoting peace, security, and the welfare of citizens'. 
Central to this other type of sovereignty is the proposition Loughlin draws from Hobbes -
that the sovereign is always meaningfully, even if minimally, representing those being 
ruled (Hobbes 1845: 171). This proposition helps to ensure that 'certain standards are 
attached to, and certain limits imposed on, the office of the representative' and 'that 
public law deals mainly with duties that attach to such offices' (Loughlin 2003: 57). 
Finally, the state for the amalgam is, as Michael Oakeshott puts it, a "'somewhat 
ramshackle construction'"  boru as nothing more than '''the activity of attending to the 
general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice ... brought together'"  in 
very difficult circumstances (Loughlin 2003:  16,79, quoting Oakeshott). In this way the 
state is whatever loose set of institutions and procedures has managed, first, to gain a 
monopoly on the means oflarge-scale violence and, secondly, to use this monopoly to 
institute a fDIm of government suited to achieving civil peace in any particular territory. 
I hope it is clear from this that the most powerful element in the amalgam is politics. As 
sovereignty and the state are reasonably obviously products of the tense relation between 
politics and law, the main import of this point is that politics is more powerful than law. Nonetheless, consistent with the idea that politics exercises what I call a restrained 
primacy, politics can never be so powerful as to violently drive law out of the relation 
altogether - something which would define a slide into extreme authoritarianism (of 
which Schmitt has often been accused; Loughlin 2003: 69; see also Pels 1998; Weiler 
1994). 
Problematic constitutionalist thinking 
Taking a lead from Schmitt, Loughlin (2009: 9) problematises 'the modem tendency to 
think of constitutions as formal documents. The constitution is assumed to be a text, the 
text is treated as being a statute, and the constitution is thus, in the course of time, 
conceived to be a document containing a set of individual constitutional laws  '. This is to 
say that constitutions become 'relativized', and as they do their fundamental role in 'the 
constitution of the state' is increasingly ignored. 
This all too often leads to 'the emergence of normativism'. Normativism is the positiou 
by which politics, state, and law are all reduced to norms, with the constitution being the 
most basic norm, the norm by which sovereignty is granted to a supposedly 'autonomous 
legal order' , itself of course nothing other than 'the totality of norms' . As Loughlin helps 
to make clear, this is extremely problematic thinking, effectively leaving politics, law, 
sovereignty, aud state out of the analysis of the operation of constitutions, or at least 
taming them such that they are treated as the non-political household pets of a moral 
discourse. Nonetheless, it is extremely pervasive thinking, to be found, as Loughlin notes 
7 (2009: 9), in claims that 'the constitutional order expresses the sovereignty of  reason or 
"the rule of law'"  . 
8 
In locating problematic constitutional thinking in various analyses of global corporate 
behavionr, particularly in those advocating the idea of global corporate citizenship, 
Thompson works very much in the context of  his longstanding research project (much of 
it undertaken with the late Paul Hirst) into the extent to which the supposedly epochal 
change of 'globalization' has actually taken place (Thompson 2008: 4; Hirst and 
Thompson 1996; Hirst, Thompson, and Bromley 2009). Among the main symptoms of 
the malaise, he argues (2006: 7), are: a commitment to the idea of the constitution as a 
residue of a fundamental norm (invoking Kelsen's Gl'lmdnorm); a commitment to the 
idea of the constitution as a guarantee of rights; a commitment to the possibility of 
transnational constitutions; and a commitment to the increasing juridification of politics 
and even of  management. 
I realise that the points I have offered so far are little more than indicators, they certainly 
do not add up to a comprehensive snrvey of the problematic constitutional thinking in 
question. This, however, will have to suffice (for recent examples of the'problematic 
thinking in operation, and of its dolorous consequences, see Loughlin 2009: 19-27; 
Thompson 2006: 5-11; 2008: 17-27). The directions taken by each of Loughlin and 
Thompson in dealing with the problem are more important to my argument here than are 
the details of their separate diagnoses. 9 
Loughlin offers three important steps on the road to a better way to think about 
constitutions. One, 'the fonnal constitution is not self-authorising; it is valid only by 
vittue of an existing political will that establishes it'. In other words, those who dream of 
a system of rule by which norms comprise the constitution, via the supposedly natural 
capacity of human minds to rise above politics and positive laws, are simply using the 
very idea of such a natural capacity as a vehicle for their own political wills. Two, the 
formal constitution's 'validity does not rest - as it might appear to - purely on its 
normative correctness or its conceptual unity' . Instead, Loughlin insists, constitutions are 
made valid in a much more 'material' way, by which he means that they are valid 
because they have won validity in this lVorld, through politics, not by relying on some 
supposedly pre-existing universal and timeless set of norms. And three, rather than being 
a project of codification, "'the unity of the constitution lies not in the constitution itself, 
but rather in the political unity, the peculiar form of existence of which is determined 
through the act of constitution making'" (Loughlin 2009: 10, quoting Schmitt). This, to 
me, is a point aimed squarely at the 'de-tethering' aspect of the problematic thinking, its 
attempt to graut to constitutions a bedrock ontological status, as a part of human nature, 
alongside and closely related to humans' supposedly natural capacity to rule themselves 
without politics, law, sovereignty, and state. 
Thompson confronts the problematic thinking in a blunt empirical way. Referring to 
global corporate behaviour generally, he says that 'there is not as yet much specific and 
formal constitution building going on in this area'. He challenges those promoting this 
idea to show that it is actually happening (2006: 7, emphasis in original; see also: 10 
Thompson 2008: 6) and he challenges those who ignore the lack of empirical evidence 
and who push on with their arguments by using Kelsenian theoretical formulations about 
constitutions being the expression of norms and/or Teubnerian theoretical formulations 
about the inexorable march ofjuridification (2006: 8-11; 2008: 17-27). 
The troubled category of social citizenship 
Two of the longest-running debates about citizenship - going back to at least the 
seventeenth century (with some aspects going back to ancient Greece and Rome) - are 
debates between a state-under-sovereignty camp and a rational-republican camp. In one 
of these long-running debates, on the very nature of citizenship, the state-under-
sovereignty camp focuses on the duties and obligations of both sides of the 'citizenship 
pact' (the sovereign on one side, the citizens on the other), while the rational-republican 
camp focuses on the rights of citizens. In the eyes of rational-republican thinkers, such 
rights provide the very raison d'etre of sovereignty, which, for them, can never be more 
than the expression of the will of the citizens, or at least the will of those of the citizens 
who have sufficiently realised their natural potential, as moral rational beings, as to be 
capable of not only governing themselves but, alongside other fully-realised moral 
rational beings, of forming and/or informing the government of those not so capable. 
In the other long running debate, on the best means of citizen formation, the state-under-
sovereignty camp has it that ideal citizens are those trained to obey the sovereign 
(provided that the sovereign - whether individual or assembly - continues to provide 11 
them with protection from external threat and from the dangers of civil war) and, if called 
on by the sovereign, to advance the interests of the state-under-sovereignty, even if it 
means giving up their lives. The rational-republican camp, on the other hand, has it that 
ideal citizens are those humans who are formed by nature as rational self-governing 
creatures, with natural virtues, towards their task of governing themselves and governing 
those who are not so capable. 
In the 2006, 2008, and 2009 papers I referred to earlier, Thompson carefully establishes 
the proposition that there is no reason that the label 'citizen' should not be applied to 
corporate entities in the same way that it is applied to individuals. He makes plain that the 
great majority of contributors to the debate about global-corporations-as-citizens take up 
the rational-republican cause, as is the case with debates about citizenship more broadly. 
For this majority, certain multinational cOlporations and their employees are potentially 
global citizens because they advance the rational-republican ideal of (self-) government 
by enlightened groups and individuals. In particular, Thompson describes (2006: 3-4; 
2008: 11-15) the way in which these multinational corporations have started, within the 
last ten years, to speak publicly about 'their promulgation of internal standards associated 
with ... [heightened] ethical, environmental and working conditions', towards the goal of 
'a new global civic society'. In other words, the idea of global corporate citizenship is 
part of a larger idea: social citizenship. For social citizenship, the social itself(or 
'society') is the force that guarantees citizenship, not politics, law, or the state. It is as if 
the social has been granted sovereignty. 12 
Thompson (esp. 2008: 4-5) is dubious about the extent to which such corporations are 
actually 'global' (as I said earlier), dubious about the extent to which any of them are the 
'good citizens' they claim to be, and just as dubious about the idea that citizenship can 
have any real meaning beyond the particular territories/jurisdictions that traditionally 
formalise it. Nonetheless, he chooses to gently counter the predominance of rational-
republican thinking, on both the 'what is citizenship?' question and the 'how best are 
citizens formed?' question, by simply highlighting some state-under-sovereignty 
alternatives (see esp.: 2008: 27-30). On one occasion, for example, he recommends to 
those advocating citizenship status for global corporations that such corporations might 
need 'not only to perform friendly good works and civic duties but also "to come to the 
aid of the state when threatened'"  (2009: 17, quoting Skinner). 
While I agree totally with Thompson about the feasibility of applying the label 'citizen' 
to corporations, I feel the need to speak more forcefully than he does to the rational-
republican majority, particularly because I wish to highlight the problems with the 
category of  social citizenship that this majority relies upon. For me, citizenship exists in 
its present form ollly because of the emergence in early modern Europe of the amalgam 
of politics, law, sovereignty, and state described earlier. Hark back all they will to the 
forms of citizenship operating in ancient Athens or ancient Rome (more often than not 
ignoring the fact that these forms were entirely dependent on slavery and were so 
restricted that there were never more citizens in either of these city-states than would fit 
today on one side of any good-size football stadium), the advocates of social citizenship 
cannot change this pressing condition of operation. 13 
State-under-sovereignty citizenship is simply the expression of the pact that Hobbes 
keeps talking about - whereby individuals and groups become subjects of the sovereign 
by either willingly agreeing to give their total obedience to the sovereign in exchange for 
the sovereign's protection from extemal and intemal threat or by having such agreement 
foisted upon them because enough of their fellow individuals and groups have so agreed 
(Hobbes 1845: 162). 
It is certainly the case that forming individuals and groups into state-under-sovereignty 
citizenship has always been a complex business. However, the complexity of citizen 
formation, whether in the seventeenth or the twenty-first century, does not alter the fact 
that citizenship is, at its core, nothing more, and nothing less, than the operation of the 
pact that helps the politics-law-sovereignty-state amalgam to serve as the basis of civil-
peace rule and, crucially, the basis of the social. 
Conclusion 
I wish to use my conclusion to say something about what I call the false grandeur of the 
social. In short, the advocates of social citizenship are deluded by this false grandeur. The 
social has never been anywhere near robust enough, even at its strongest, to survive 
without the 'big four' - politics, law, sovereignty, state. 14 
So, while we might sensibly think of state-under-sovereignty citizens, in being formed in 
ever more complex ways, as protectors of the social-which is, after all, a domain 
produced and protected by state-under-sovereignty arrangements - they are only 'social 
citizens' because of  the operation of state-under-sovereignty arrangements; without these 
anangements there would be no citizenship and no social. 
The advocates of social citizenship do not recognise this vital condition of citizenship and 
of the social, for they do not recognise the constraints of politics, law, sovereignty, and 
state. Instead, they allow themselves the luxury of thinking that the social is a strong, 
totally independent domain, above politics, law, sovereignty, and state. 
Who could capture the spirit of this type of thinking better than Kant? 
"The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a 
hidden plan of nature to bring into being an internally - and for this purpose also 
an externally - perfect political constitution, as the only condition in which she 
can fully develop all of her capacities in mankind" ... the perfect republican 
constitution - in which citizens govern themselves through public laws 
executing their own common will (Hunter 2009, quoting Kant). 
In the light of these observations, it has to be said that social citizenship is a category 
which has to be handled with such delicacy that it is not worth pursuing. It  is 
unsustainable. IS 
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